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REGULATING SPERM DONATION: WHY REQUIRING EXPOSED
DONATION IS NOT THE ANSWER
VANESSA L. PI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, more than 25,000 children are born in the United States as the
result of artificial insemination,1 one of the most common forms of assisted
reproductive technology (ART).2 Donated sperm is usually the crucial element
in artificial insemination,3 and most sperm is donated anonymously in one of
the two dozen commercial sperm banks in this country.4 Presently, there is a
serious lack of meaningful regulation over and accountability on the part of
sperm banks, and the current system has many flaws. These include incomplete
medical histories for the donor-conceived child, a risk of consanguinity for the
child, and uncertainty about donor privacy.5 Because of these flaws, some
countries and states have, or are considering, legislation that would institute a
non-anonymous donation6 (referred to as “exposed donation” throughout this
article) regime. This is a faulty solution because it would cause scarcity of
donated sperm and other harms to each of the parties involved in the process.7
This article argues that the harms of abolishing anonymity in sperm donation far
outweigh any potential benefits; thus states should reaffirm donor anonymity
and institute the changes proposed in Part V.
Although there is currently little federal regulation of sperm donation,8 the
few states that have laws and regulations apply rules of limited scope.9 In

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2009. The author would like to thank
Professor Jeremy Mullem and her “Writing for Publication” classmates for their thoughtful and
greatly appreciated insight and comments.
1. See ETHEL SLOAN, BIOLOGY OF WOMEN 401 (Cengage Learning 2001); Jeff Stryker, Regulation
or Free Markets? An Uncomfortable Question for Sperm Banks, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Nov. 7, 2007, available
at http://www.scienceprogress.org/2007/11/regulation-or-free-markets/.
2. Infertility in Men, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://health.nytimes.com/
health/guides/disease/infertility-in-men/assisted-reproductive-technologies.html. Other forms of
ART are intracytoplasmic sperm injection, in vitro fertilization, in vitro maturation, blastocyst
transfer, and ooplasmic transfer. Id.
3. A couple can instead choose to use the sperm of the male partner in the artificial
insemination, or use what is referred to by the Food and Drug Administration as a “directed
donation.” 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(l) (2008). The latter is defined as one to a specific person, where the
donor knows or is known by the recipient before donation, but does not include a sexually intimate
partner. Id.
4. Stryker, supra note 2.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2008).
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addition to briefly explaining the history and science behind ART and sperm
donation in particular, Part II of this article discusses the inadequate Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations, which focus merely on preventing
“diseased” sperm from being circulated10 and do little to control the number of
births per donor or facilitate contact between donor and child regarding genetic
disorders discovered after insemination. Part II will also present the
decentralized state regulation, as well as the guidelines of professional
organizations, with the latter effectively being optional and not legally binding.
Due to this lack of meaningful government oversight, there are many risks
and concerns associated with the existing sperm donation process. These risks
will be presented in Part III. First, the risk of incest and consanguinity11 are
prevalent with anonymous donation12 since there is no monitoring of the
number of live births per donor. Also, a donor cloaked in anonymity is unlikely
and unable to contact children conceived with his sperm should he discover he
has a serious genetic disorder.13 Similarly, it is nearly impossible for a parent of
a donor-conceived child to obtain additional information from a donor, should
the child’s medical condition necessitate it, without knowledge of a donor’s
identity and whereabouts. Donors may also be found to have diminished
expectations of privacy,14 especially because of the ability for donor-conceived
children or their parents to investigate a donor’s identity using modern
genealogy services.15 Many states are attempting to pass bills calling for more
identity disclosure in the medical files of women using artificial insemination, as
well as a requirement that clinics offer the option to donate non-anonymously.16
In fact, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)17 and some state laws already allow
access to donor files by court order.18
Attention from scholars and the current international trend toward
exposed donation19 may hasten, or at the very least trigger, a similar movement
in the United States as the solution to the risks just mentioned. As Part IV will
argue, the answer to the call for regulation of sperm donation is not the outright
elimination of anonymity. Not only is it logical that requiring exposed donation

9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See Sunni Yuen, An Information Privacy Approach to Regulating the Middlemen in the Lucrative
Gametes Market, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 527, 554 (2007) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1). Diseased sperm
includes sperm that tests positive for HIV and hepatitis. § 1271.1(r).
11. Consanguinity is defined as “kinship characterized by the sharing of common ancestors.”
Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/133242/consanguinity
(last visited Dec. 15, 2008).
12. Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 15–16 (2007).
13. See infra Part III.A.2.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See Alison Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 5, 2005,
at 6.
16. See infra Part III.C.1.
17. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 633(b) (2002).
18. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(1) and (2) (West 2008) (Colorado’s own Uniform
Parentage Act (not modeled after the actual new UPA) states that records may be obtained upon a
court order showing good cause.).
19. See infra Part III.C.2.
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will attract fewer donors, many countries that have taken this route have
experienced varying degrees of scarcity in donated sperm.20 This may result in
an undue burden on procreation,21 as well as “fertility tourism”22 which would
circumvent any U.S. oversight. Exposed sperm donation may also have an
unsettling effect on donors’ privacy rights and could interfere with donors’ legal
status as “non-parents” since anonymity is the bedrock on which that status is
based.23 This “solution” does not balance the interests of donors, donorconceived children and the latter’s parents correctly with the need for
substantive regulation.
In Part V, this article proposes that the answer to this call for sperm
donation regulation lies in expanding the reach of progressive regulation
already enacted by some states. Rather than abolish anonymous donation
altogether, states should uniformly adopt the UPA, or at the very least enact
laws clearly setting forth a donor’s status. Also, as suggested by the UPA,24
states should only allow access to donor information by court order showing
“good cause.” Lastly, the creation of a national donor and donor-offspring
registry would ease concerns about consanguinity and incest.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CURRENT REGULATION OF SPERM DONATION
Assisted reproduction is defined as any means of conception not achieved
through sexual intercourse.25 ARTs include artificial intrauterine insemination,
egg and embryo donation, in vitro fertilization and sperm injection.26 ARTs are
used primarily to assist individuals who are unable to conceive children,
whether due to the actual infertility of either partner or to the “social structure
in which [an individual or a couple] self-identif[ies].”27 The use of ARTs is
growing due to various factors such as the increase in single and same-sex
parenthood28 and the increasingly common choice by many couples to delay

20. See e.g., June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building
Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 519–20 (2006)
(discussing the shortages in Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands).
21. Dennison, supra note 12, at 19 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
22. See generally Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 632 (2002).
25. American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q.
171, 175 (2008).
26. Id. Intrauterine insemination involves the injection of sperm intro a woman’s reproductive
tract. Crystal Liu, Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What is a Justified Limitation on Reproductive
Freedom?, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 291, 295 (2009). Egg and embryo donation is donation by an
individual of their own eggs or sperm, whether or not for consideration or for a particular person.
American Bar Association, supra note 25, at 176. In vitro fertilization is the “formation of a human
embryo outside the human body.” Id. at 177. Sperm injection is the injection of a single sperm
directly into an egg. Catherine A. Clements, What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 84 IND. L.J. 331, 333 (2009).
27. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008). The latter occurs when a same-sex couple or a single
person wishes to reproduce.
28. Id. at 30–32.
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having children until later in life.29 As mentioned, sperm donation is a crucial
element to many types of ART, such as in vitro fertilization, allowing single
women, same-sex female couples, and couples with an infertile male to conceive
children. In fact, the number of children born from sperm donation has doubled
in recent years.30 Although sperm may be donated by a relative or close friend of
the couple or individual, often the sperm is donated anonymously through a
sperm bank or clinic.
Sperm donors choose to donate for various reasons. Primarily, sperm and
egg donors are motivated by the monetary compensation,31 which many use to
pay for college or graduate school, or simply to supplement savings or
disposable income.32 Others choose to donate for altruistic reasons, such as to
assist infertile couples or others who are unable to conceive children on their
own.33 Many banks inquire into individual donor’s motivations during the
screening process.34 This Part discusses the regulation of sperm donation by the
FDA, by individual states, by the sperm banks themselves, and by professional
organizations.
A. Food and Drug Administration
The federal government regulates all sperm banks and clinics by making
compliance with FDA regulations mandatory.35 Its regulation of sperm banks
focuses on “donor screening, quality processing, and record keeping [with
the] . . . goal [of] keep[ing] infectious tissue out of circulation.”36 The FDA’s
regulations cover both anonymous donations and non-anonymous donations.37
Under §1271, FDA regulation of sperm banks is divided into three areas: 1)

29. Matthew W. Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: How the FDCPA is Failing America’s
Elderly Debtors, 16 ELDER L.J. 135, 151 (2008).
30. Id. at 33–34 (citing 2005 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and
Fertility Clinic Reports 3, 61 (2007), available at http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/ ART2005/clinics05.asp).
31. Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg Donors in Assisted
Reproduction Technology, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 167, n.1 (2008).
32. Gail Taylor, Becoming a Sperm Donor (2008), https://knol.google.com/k/gail-taylor/
becoming-a-sperm-donor/1oq66jc8zi8jp/4#What_Motivates_a_Sperm_Donor (last visited Dec. 15,
2008).
33. Id. See also Allison Brown, Money Shots: College Students Profit, Help Infertile Couples by
Donating Their Sperm and Eggs, The Daily Free Press, http://www.cryobank.com/resources/
pdf/News/DailyFreePressJan04.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
34. E.g., How Do You Test and Screen Sperm Donors-Cryos New York,
http://ny.cryosinternational.com/our-donors/screening.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2008); Sperm
Donors, Inc., http://www.spermdonorsinc.com/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2008).
35. Sperm donation is regulated under 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2008). See Luke A. Boso, The Unjust
Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies to End Discrimination in the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L.
REV. 843, 846–49 (2008).
36. See §1271.1; Sunni Yuen, supra note 10, at 554.
37. Martha A. Wells, Ctr. for Biologics, Evaluation, and Research at the FDA, FDA Update:
Relevant to Reprod. Establishments, Presentation at American Association of Tissue Banks Annual
Meeting (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/CbER/tissue/aatb091707mw.pdf.
Directed donation is defined as one to a specific person, where the donor knows or is known by the
recipient before donation, but does not include a sexually intimate partner. § 1271.3(l).
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Establishment, 2) Registration and Product Listing, Donor Eligibility, and 3)
Current Good Tissue Practice (CGTP).38
With some exceptions,39 sperm banks and clinics must register with the
FDA using Form FDA 33556, which asks for very basic information such as the
center’s physical and mailing addresses, its functions, and the type of tissue(s) it
maintains.40 As of March 2007, 607 reproductive centers were registered, which
comprise twenty-four percent of all tissue centers registered.41 Of those 607
centers, only about eighty-nine list semen as among the tissue being
maintained.42 The two types of sperm centers registered with the FDA are
cryobanks, which accept anonymous donations, and andrology labs, which store
sperm for procedures for intimate couples.43 This paper will focus on the former,
since that is where the issues presented in Part III arise.
The FDA’s Donor Eligibility requirements apply to both anonymous and
directed donations.44 In addition to a summary of records for each semen
donation, the FDA requires a screening of each donor comprised of a physical
examination and a donor medical history interview.45 The FDA lists twenty-nine
risk factors that clinics should look for when screening donors.46 For anonymous
donations, the FDA requires that donors be tested for diseases like HIV and
hepatitis while their sperm is frozen and quarantined, to be released six months
later when certified as “disease-free.”47 Exceptions to the donor eligibility
requirement include when the donor is a sexually intimate partner of the
recipient and when additional donations are unavailable due to the donor’s
infertility or health.48 Those donations exempt from the eligibility requirements

38. Wells, supra note 37.
39. § 1271.15 (listing exemptions such as establishments that use the tissue for nonclinical
scientific or educational purposes, remove and implant the same tissue in the same patient, or only
store the tissue). § 1271.15(a)–(c).
40. § 1271.22. Examples of tissue types are bone, cartilage, semen, skin, and tendons. §
1271.3(d).
41. Wells, supra note 37. The term “tissue center” appears to be synonymous with
“establishment,” which is defined as “a place of business under one management, at one general
physical location, that engages in the manufacture of human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissuebased products.” 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(b) (2008).
42. Wells, supra note 37.
43. Id. Andrology labs store sperm for use by the donors themselves. “Intimate couples” are
those with a relationship.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1271.3(n) (defining “donor medical history” as a “document dialog about the donor’s
medical history and relevant social behavior . . .”).
46. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION
FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS, IV.E. (2008).
The risk factors include: men who have had sex with men within the preceding five years, persons
who have injected drugs for non-medical reasons within the preceding five years, and persons who
have been exposed in the preceding twelve months to known or suspected HIV and/or HIV-infected
blood.
47. Stryker, supra note 2. There is no required quarantine period for directed or known
donations. Wells, supra note 37.
48. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(a) (2008).
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are subject to labeling, which warns the purchaser that, for example, testing for
infectious diseases was not done.49
Current Good Tissue Practice requirements “govern the methods used in,
and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture” of human tissue and
cells.50 The aspects covered by CGTP requirements range from “recovery” and
donor screening to storage and distribution.51 There are also exemptions made
to this section of the regulation, but the establishment seeking such an
exemption must separately apply for each and provide a proposed alternative.52
CGTP requirements also include periodic inspections of reproductive
establishments to evaluate compliance with the donor eligibility procedures and
record-keeping.53
In addition to the requirements and regulations just discussed, it is
important to note that the FDA does not require sperm banks to place limits on
births to individual donors, or even to report such a number, to track donors’
health, or to make information available to children born to sperm donors.54
B. State Regulation
Individual states regulate aspects of the ART process related to sperm
donation by licensing sperm banks, controlling the artificial insemination
process, and determining parent legitimacy in these situations. Only twentyfour states have created regulatory legislation addressing the operations of
sperm banks.55 Some states set forth specific requirements for artificial
insemination. For example, a state can require that artificial insemination must
be performed under the supervision of a licensed physician.56 Others set forth
testing requirements and require licensing and registry of all sperm banks.57
Most states regulate the parent-child relationship as affected by sperm donation
by setting forth who are deemed the natural and legitimate parents of a child
conceived through artificial insemination.58 California makes it a felony for a
person who knows he has HIV or AIDS to donate sperm.59
49. § 1271.90(b).
50. § 1271.150(a).
51. Id.
52. § 1271.155.
53. § 1271.180.
54. Stryker, supra note 2.
55. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1621.5(a) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801(a)
(2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0041 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5408 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.281(1) (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1062.1(b)(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18334 (b)(2)(i) (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20179 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1008(1) (2008);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:5 (2008); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.5(1)(ii) (2008); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 130A-148(d) (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151.1 (West 2008); OR. REV.
STAT. § 677.370 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1-38 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105(2)(d)
(LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3c-2(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
56. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-202 (2008).
57. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801(a) (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0041 (LexisNexis 2008).
58. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-102 (LexisNexis 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2008); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-201 (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (Deering 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-5 (2008);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (LexisNexis 2008).
59. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1621.5(a) (Deering 2007).
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The UPA, in its model form, covers many paternity issues, such as
voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, genetic testing to determine paternity,
and paternity proceedings.60 The original UPA, which was drafted in 1973, has
been adopted by nineteen states.61 Article 5 of the model form provides that
when a child is conceived through artificial insemination using a donor’s sperm,
the donor is not considered the child’s father.62 It does this by establishing that
the married woman’s husband is considered the child’s natural father.63
Importantly, the original UPA addressed only situations in which the child’s
mother was a married woman and in which the procedure was performed by a
licensed physician.64 The amended version of the UPA (new UPA), finalized in
2002 and only adopted by eight states thus far, 65 specifically addresses
reproductive technology issues. Whereas “[t]he original version of the UPA
exempted most sperm donors from parental liability,” the new version’s model
form goes further by stating that a “donor is not a parent of a child conceived by
means of assisted reproduction.”66 Thus, according to the commentary, the
donor cannot sue to establish his parental rights nor can he be required to
provide child support.67 Importantly, the new UPA does not limit this principle
to situations involving a married woman and does not require that a licensed
physician perform the artificial insemination.68 Also, both versions of the UPA
contain a provision allowing an inspection of paternity records upon a court
order for “good cause shown.”69
Because it addresses ARTs specifically and in a more modern context, the
following analysis focuses on the new UPA in noting deviations between the
versions that individual states have incorporated into their statutes and the
actual new UPA language. Some states do not include the language in Section
702 that states that a donor is not considered the parent of a child conceived
through ART.70 Others have transferred that exact language to their own UPA
statutes.71 Some have retained the “good cause shown” standard for
insemination records,72 while others do not mention that records may be

60. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002).
61. LAURENCE C. NOLAN & LYNN D. WARDLE, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 247
(Wm. S. Hein Publishing 2005).
62. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Alabama, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. A
Few
Facts
About
the
Uniform
Parentage
Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp (last visited Dec. 16, 2008). The bill proposing
adoption in New Mexico died on adjournment. S.B. 147, 48th Legis., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008).
66. Paul Bailin, Ferguson v. McKiernan: The Problematic Concept of Technological Paternity, 36 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2008) (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002) and commentary).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 20 (1973) with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 632 (2002).
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-633 (2008).
71. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (Vernon 2008).
72. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (LexisNexis 2008) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-633 (2008).
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released by court order.73 Many states have adopted both of these relevant
aspects of the new UPA.74 Among the states that have not adopted the UPA,
some have independently chosen to incorporate either or both of the relevant
provisions of it into their own statutes.75
States that have not adopted the new UPA often inconsistently and
incompletely address the issues of a donor’s parental status and access to donor
records. For example, an appellate court in California held that parents of an
ART-conceived child and the child herself could compel the production of
documents so long as relevant and necessary to their action against a sperm
bank for selling sperm that allegedly was contaminated with kidney disease.76 A
Florida court and a Maine court have also not recognized a sperm donor to be
the parent of an ART-conceived child, and thus held that the donor did not have
parental rights.77
C. Sperm Banks
To a certain extent, sperm banks are self-regulating in that some choose to
place limits and rules upon themselves, likely recognizing the lack of actual,
meaningful federal or state regulation. The banks that choose to self-regulate set
up policies “to improve the overall efficacy of the sperm donation system.”78 For
example, Cryogenic Laboratories claims to track and monitor each donor and
their sperm to determine, among other things, the geographic distribution of the
donor’s offspring.79 Similarly, Cryos International limits donor offspring in a
particular region to one in 32,000.80 California Cryobanks opts to perform

73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8-702 (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (Vernon
2008).
74. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-54 and 14-20-60 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-702 and
78B-15-619 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.705 and 26.26.610 (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-2-902 and 14-2-819 (2008).
75. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.62(5)(c) (2008) (Minnesota statute stating that a sperm donor cannot
claim to be a child’s biological or legal parent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97(D) (LexisNexis 2008)
(Ohio law also stating that a sperm donor is not a parent, and has no parental rights or
responsibilities); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (2008) (Virginia also establishes that “a donor is not
the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(1)
and (2) (West 2008) (Colorado’s own Uniform Parentage Act, not modeled after the actual new UPA,
states that records may be obtained upon a court order showing good cause.).
76. Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). (The court
considered two factors in its decision: that the bank had told donors that non-identifying
information could be disclosed to purchasers and that there were compelling state interests at stake
in this case.).
77. Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So .2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); In re Guardianship of I.H., 2003
ME 130, 834 A.2d 922 (Me. 2003).
78. Omar Hasan, Amber Johnson, Shira Lipton & Rachel Turow, New Ways of Making Babies: The
Biology, Ethics, and Policy of Infertility–What Policies Govern Sperm Donation?,
http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/reprotech/New%20Ways%20of%20Making%2
0Babies/spermpol.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
79. Id.
80. First Steps-Cryos New York, http://ny.cryosinternational.com/for-parents.aspx (last
visited Dec. 19, 2008).
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genetic screening, setting it apart from other banks.81 Because this is still selfregulation overseen by no one, many banks choose to become members of
private organizations, which have their own policies.
D. Private Organizations
Professional organizations attempt to govern important aspects of the
sperm donation process by publishing standards and guidelines aimed at
adequate screening, control over children per donor, and monitoring of a
donor’s genetic and medical history. However, as these are institutions that
sperm banks may choose to be associated with, these guidelines are effectively
non-binding and merely suggestions. The following three professional
organizations have published non-binding, voluntary guidelines for sperm
banks and clinics.
1. American Society of Reproductive Medicine
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has published
several useful guidelines that address some of the most important issues in
sperm donation. For example, the ASRM recommends establishing a system for
ongoing monitoring of a donor’s health status, even after donation.82 It also
suggests a limit of twenty-five live births per sperm donor for every population
area of 800,000.83 However, banks are not required to report births and it is
estimated that, in fact, only 40% of births are actually reported.84 Lastly, ASRM
advises parents to disclose to their children the details of their conception,
though it opposes any additional regulation of the industry.85 Although the
ASRM may discipline a member through expulsion, a call for resignation, or
other action,86 membership in the ASRM is otherwise purely voluntary.
2. American Association of Tissue Banks
The American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) Standards for Tissue
Banking relates to donor screening, emphasizing the usefulness of genetic
testing.87 Its mission is “to establish and promulgate standards to provide tissue
banks with performance requirements intended to prevent disease

81. Donor Selection-California Cryobank, http://www.cryobank.com/Why-Use-Us/DonorSelection/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
82. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2002 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo
Donation: A Practice Committee Report, 11 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S5 (2002).
83. Id.
84. Large Groups of Half Siblings, Donor Sibling Registry Blog, July 18, 2008, http://
www.donorsiblingregistry.com/DSRblog/?p=55 (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
85. Stryker, supra note 2 (A spokesperson for the ASRM has stated that “[m]ore regulation of
sperm banking is a solution in search of a problem”). The basis for this opposition is that more
regulation gives up “important autonomy and privacy at great economic expense.” Id.
86. ASRM
Disciplinary
Policy,
http://www.asrm.org/Professionals/Membership/
disciplinary_policy.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
87. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TISSUE BANKS, STANDARDS FOR TISSUE BANKING 21–32 (Richard J.
Kagan, M.D., ed., 1998).
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transmission.”88 All member institutions are required to comply with the
mandatory standards, but accreditation by the AATB is merely “strongly
recommended” and not required to operate as a tissue bank.89 There is neither
mention of limits on distributions per donor nor of ongoing monitoring of a
donor’s health.
3. American Fertility Society
The American Fertility Society’s (AFS) 1990 guidelines also emphasize the
importance of the genetic history of donors.90 It recommends that records of the
genetic history or testing of the donor be made available—upon request and on
an anonymous basis—to the recipient and any resulting children.91 Like the
ASRM, the AFS suggests a pregnancy limit per donor.92 Specifically, it
recommends ten pregnancies per donor, or under ten if recipients are members
of an isolated subgroup of the population.93
4. Donor Sibling Registry
Although not a professional organization like the three above-mentioned
associations, the Donor Sibling Registry (DSR) acts in a quasi-regulatory manner
by adding more transparency and illuminating some of the problems with the
current system. DSR is a website that serves donors, donor-conceived children,
and their parents. As of December 2008, DSR had 22,819 members.94 Donors and
donor-conceived children are able to sign up using the number assigned to the
donor by a sperm bank.95 When multiple users sign up using the same donor
number, a “match” is made.96 More commonly, these matches occur between
half-siblings, but a number of donor-offspring matches have resulted.97 As of
December 2008, over 5,000 matches had been made on the DSR website.98 The
largest match between half-siblings is a startling 105 matches!99 Not only do
these numbers illustrate the consanguinity risks to be discussed below, they

88.
89.
90.

Id. at Introduction.
Id.
American Fertility Society, New Guidelines for the Use of Sperm Donor Insemination: 1990, 53
FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S8 (Supp. 1 1990).
91. Id. at S4.
92. Id.
93. Id. “Isolated subgroup” is not defined in the Guidelines, nor do they provide any
explanation as to this modification to the limit. However, an example of an “isolated subgroup”
might be if the population using the donor insemination was limited to certain individuals because
the clinic is the only one in a small town.
94. Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/index.php (last visited Dec.
16, 2008).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Fairfax
Cryobank
Listings
on
Donor
Sibling
Registry,
http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/ListRegistry.php?keyword=&dpTypeID=1&faID=15&dpIde
ntityNumber=&usUserName_startswith=&usTypeID=&faCity_contains=&faStateID=&faCountryID
=&dpDateCreated_isgreaterthan=&doSearch=Search+Registry (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
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show that if such a registry were mandated and inclusive of all donations
nationwide, it would be effective in solving that problem.
III. PROBLEMS WITH UNREGULATED SPERM DONATION
Unregulated anonymous sperm donation raises many concerns and
problems, particularly the health risks to donor-conceived children and their
offspring, such as genetic disorders and consanguinity, and a diminishment of
donor privacy. Current regulation by the FDA, individual states, and
professional organizations lacks uniformity and fails to provide real solutions to
these problems. This Part will also introduce the faulty solution some states and
countries have chosen, which is analyzed further in Part IV.
A. Health Concerns
Anonymous sperm donation presently causes a risk of incest among
unknowing half-siblings conceived using the same donor’s sperm, which can
lead to consanguinity. Also, limited access to information about a donor’s health
after donation leaves donor-conceived children with an incomplete medical
history.
1. Consanguinity
As mentioned above, sperm banks are primarily self-regulating entities.100
Aside from voluntary guidelines issued by the major professional organizations,
sperm banks are not required to report the number of live births per donor.101
Thus, it is entirely possible that one sperm donor can be the biological parent of
numerous children.102 This concern is compounded when one considers that
these children may well grow up in the same geographic area surrounding the
bank where their mothers obtained the sperm used in the ART. Even more
troublesome is the fact that there are particular characteristics that result in a
few frequently requested donors,103 and a bank can divide up a single donation
to sell the sperm to numerous recipients.104 In fact, a search on The Donor
Sibling Registry shows that “one particular donor, number 1476 of the Fairfax
Cryobank, is the biological father of at least 36 children all born between 2002
and 2007.”105 Although some individual clinics have chosen to limit the number
100. Dennison, supra note 12, at 15 (citing Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation & Anonymity: The Ethical
and Legal Debate, 16 HUMAN REPROD. 818, 821 (2001)).
101. Banks are merely required to report the number of live births generally. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-1
(2009).
102. Id. (citing Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a Health Hazard,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/health/
06opin.html?_r=1). Recently, thirty lesbian women in Adelaide, Australia were inseminated by
sperm from the same man. In another case, one man’s sperm produced twenty-nine children in the
same city in Australia. Unregulated Sperm Donation Causes 30 Women to Be Impregnated by Same Man,
FOX NEWS, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,434511,00.html.
103. Nordic donors are some of the most popular because of their blond hair and blue eyes,
tendency to be tall and to hold advanced degrees. Rob Stein, Mad Cow Rules Hit Sperm Banks’ Patrons,
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at A01.
104. Dennison, supra note 12, at 15 (citing Grady, supra note 104).
105. Id.
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of donations or births per donor,106 there is no requirement that clinics share
information regarding these statistics.107
2. Access to Medical History
Although the FDA requires comprehensive donor screening for infectious
diseases, it does not require genetic testing or even a procedure for continued
monitoring of a donor’s health.108 Although a donor can consent to allowing a
sperm bank to release non-identifying medical information to a recipient, that
would still cover only disorders and diseases up to that point. Should a donor
later develop a serious medical condition that may have been genetically passed
on to an ART-conceived child, he is not required to contact either the sperm
bank, the recipient-mother, or the child.
B. Donors’ Concerns About Their Privacy
Donor privacy is becoming less absolute, and it appears that a state could
require disclosure of information that a donor assumed, and that a sperm bank
promised, would be anonymous. In fact, at least in California, a donor’s
constitutional right to privacy can be diminished by another person’s actions.109
A California Court of Appeals case in 2000 determined the level of protection
given to a sperm donor’s level of privacy.110 Commentators describing the
court’s holding have reported that “donor information from an anonymous
donor could be disclosed under certain circumstances.”111 Although other states
have not addressed this issue, most other states are like California in that the
state’s constitutional right to privacy provides even more privacy than federal
laws, so the Johnson analysis could be extrapolated to other states.112 By creating
the possibility that a state might require disclosure, the Johnson decision affects a
donor’s privacy in two ways: by establishing that a donor “can have a
diminished expectation of privacy and that contractual protection of a donor’s
information may not be sufficient to prevent its disclosure.”113
1. Diminished Expectations of Privacy
The Johnson court held that the donor’s reasonable expectation of privacy
was “substantially diminished” for two reasons.114 First, the sperm clinic
routinely informed its donors that non-identifying information and medical
106. E.g., The Sperm Bank of California, http://www.thespermbankofca.org/pages/
page.php?pageid=2 (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
107. Dennison, supra note 12, at 16.
108. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2008).
109. Dennison, supra note 12, at 21. See infra Part III.B.1.
110. Id. (citing Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000)).
111. Id. Since the case did not involve a donor-conceived child seeking access to information, the
court did not elaborate on the circumstances under which a court may disclose such information
pursuant to the UPA. Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor
Gamete Registry, DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. (forthcoming 2009).
112. Dennison, supra note 12, at 21–22.
113. Id. at 22.
114. Id. (quoting Johnson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1055).
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history may be disclosed to purchasers, which lessened a donor’s expectation
that such information would never be revealed.115 Second, the donor’s own
conduct diminished his expectation of privacy in his identity because his very
frequent donations amounted to a “substantial commercial transaction likely to
affect the lives of many people.”116
Clinics are increasingly offering to potential purchasers more donor
information, such as interests, education, baby photographs, and audio
interviews.117 Donors knowingly provide this additional information and thus
are aware that it is made available to purchasers.118
In addition, it is increasingly difficult to maintain anonymity in the modern
age. Another recent development that may diminish a donor’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is the very real possibility that donor-conceived children
and their parents may be able to discover the donor’s identity. Recently, a
fifteen-year old boy in the United Kingdom traced his sperm donor’s identity on
the Internet using a genealogy DNA-testing service.119 The boy used a DNAtesting service to match up with two other people with same paternal line,
which is determined by the gene variants carried by a person’s Y
chromosome.120 The similarity between their Y chromosomes suggested that
they must have the same father, grandfather, or great-grandfather, and the two
matches shared the same last name.121 Already knowing his donor’s birthplace
and date of birth, the boy purchased from an online service the names of
everyone born in the same place on the same day, which revealed one person
with that particular last name.122 Thus, any internet-savvy teenager with a few
hundred dollars could likely make the same discovery.
2. Weak Contractual Protection of Donor Privacy
The Johnson court also found that the contract between parents and clinics
expressly prohibiting disclosure of the donor’s identity under “any and all
circumstances” cannot enhance the donor’s expectation of privacy because it is
contrary to public policy.123 This implies that the child’s best interests, including
health, consanguinity, and psychological well-being, are likely an overriding
concern.124 The possibility that a donor-conceived child may be able to discover

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 23 (citing California Cryobank Donor Catalog, California Cryobank, http://
www.cryobank.com/catalog/indexb.CFM; Donor Information, Fairfax Cryobank, http://
www.fairfaxcryobank.com/donorinfo.aspx?menu=4&turn=on).
118. Id.
119. Motluk, supra note 15.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Dennison, supra note 12 (citing Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist. 2000)).
124. Id.
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a donor’s identity, mentioned above, is also of concern in this area, as clinics are
less confident in their ability to guarantee complete anonymity.125
C. Recent State and International Trends
Within the past decade, both states and foreign countries have moved
away, or attempted to move away, from complete anonymity for sperm donors.
States have gradually begun to consider bills proposing to either list a donor’s
identity in the mother’s medical chart126 or to give donors the option to allow a
clinic to reveal their identity to the donor-conceived child.127 Internationally,
anonymous donation is available in fewer and fewer places,128 while some
countries are instead releasing a donor’s identity when donor-conceived
children reach a certain age.129
1. State Trends
Recently, states have attempted to reduce donor anonymity. First, the
Johnson case mentioned above allows access to a donor’s information in certain
circumstances.130 Although legislative proposals have primarily been futile, they
nonetheless represent a growing interest in recognizing the above-mentioned
concerns as being as important as, or even overriding, a donor’s privacy right. A
Virginia bill introduced in 2006 attempted to require that all unrelated sperm
donors be identified in the medical chart of any unmarried female purchasers.131
Had it not been voted down, this would in effect have prohibited anonymous
donation for unmarried women, one of the main groups that benefit from sperm
donation. Michigan also proposed requiring licensed fertility clinics to provide
donors with the option to sign a contract authorizing the clinic to reveal the
donor’s information to the ART-conceived child.132
As described previously, the UPA allows access to a donor’s medical file
upon court order for good cause.133 This likely includes cases of medical
necessity for donor-conceived children.134 In addition to those states that have
adopted the UPA, several states have enacted legislation that would permit
donor-conceived children to obtain donor information on court order, based on
a satisfactory showing of “good cause” or a similar standard.135 “Good cause”
may be satisfied when a child or parent needs access to the donor’s information

125. Id. at 24 (citing Betsy Streisand, Who’s Your Daddy?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 2006,
http://usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/060213/13donor.htm).
126. H.B. 187, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006).
127. H.R. 5605, 93rd Leg., 2006 Sess. (Mich. 2006).
128. See infra Part III.C.2.
129. E.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).
130. Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000).
131. H.B. 187, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006).
132. H.R. 5605, 93rd Leg., 2006 Sess. (Mich. 2006). The bill never reached a vote.
133. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 632 (2002).
134. Hollace S.W. Swanson, Donor Anonymity In Artificial Insemination: Is It Still Necessary?, 27
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 151, 188 (1993).
135. Dennison, supra note 12, at n80.
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for early detection of a genetic disease or for location of a relative for a
“lifesaving transplant procedure.”136
2. International Trends
Responding to the rise in ART development and use, many countries have
enacted legislation that regulates sperm donation. Some have chosen to
eliminate anonymous donation altogether, whereas others are requiring
disclosure of a donor’s information when a donor-conceived child reaches the
age of majority. The United Nations (U.N.) has even taken steps acknowledging
a child’s right to know her parents.
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, and parts of Australia do not permit
anonymous donation.137 These jurisdictions have prohibited anonymous
donation in order to encourage children to contact their donors when they reach
the age of majority.138 The United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 1990 takes a different approach by requiring disclosure once a
donor-conceived child comes of age.139 At eighteen, the child can request
identifying and non-identifying information about the donor.140 However, this is
only allowed with the donor’s consent.141 Britain has also instituted a limit on
creating ten families per donor.142 Similarly, in New Zealand the Human
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004 provides mechanisms for
accessing information by both donors and donor-conceived children, and
established a registry for this purpose.143 Those children have access to the
information on the donor at age eighteen, or at sixteen or seventeen with a court
order.144 The Act’s guiding principles include that donor-conceived children
should know of their genetic origins and be able to access information about
those origins.145
In 1989, the U.N. recognized the right to know one’s parents as a
fundamental human right in its Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).146
Although nearly 200 countries have ratified the CRC, the United States has yet
to do so.147 In fact, it and Somalia are the only two U.N. member states that have

136. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 875 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000).
137. Dennison, supra note 12, at 9.
138. Id.
139. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004, 2004 S.N.Z. No. 92; Ken Daniels and Alison
Douglass, Access to Genetic Information by Donor Offspring and Donors: Medicine, Policy, and Law in New
Zealand, 27 MED. L. 131 (2008) (for children conceived after August 2005).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONVENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Sept. 20, 1990, available at http:// www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/k2crc.htm.
147. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, June 9, 2004, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
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not ratified the CRC.148 Although the United States has given no reason as to
why it has chosen not to ratify the CRC, one possible cause is the hesitance of
conservative organizations that believe ratification would have implications for
issues like abortion, education, and discipline.149 Other critics believe that the
CRC undermines a parent’s roles and that it is “anti-parent” and “antifamily.”150 If any of these possible reasons change or are overcome, ratification
by the United States of the CRC could lead to erosion of the anonymous
donation process. Also, as of his inauguration, President Barack Obama had not
expressed whether he intends to ratify the CRC.151
IV. WHY EXPOSED DONATION IS NOT THE ANSWER
Recent state and international trends as well as commentators152 suggest
that information disclosure and donor–child/parent contact solve the problems
discussed in Part III. As shown, some countries have even gone the way of an
outright ban on anonymous donation,153 and proponents of that view believe
that the environment in which ART came about decades ago, which encouraged
secrecy about these issues, has changed.154 However, allowing only exposed
donation creates far greater problems, such as scarcity of donations and other
harms to donors, the medical profession, and society. As discussed in Part V,
infra, a combination of the new UPA and some comprehensive regulation of the
sperm bank industry may be far more effective.
A. Scarcity
Banning sperm donors from donating sperm anonymously would result in
fewer donations overall. In fact, requiring exposed donations elsewhere has
actually led to fewer sperm donations in those countries. The previously
mentioned U.K. regulations have caused scarcity, 155 which has lead to “pressure
to accept donors with suboptimal characteristics, long waiting lists, and the
development of a fresh semen market on the Internet, often with unscreened
semen.”156 Other countries have experienced shortages as a result of similar
legislation.157 Requiring exposed donation in the United States could cause
148. Id.
149. Devanshi P. Patel, Should Teenagers Get LoJacked Against Their Will?: An Argument for the
Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 47 HOW. L.J. 429, 435 n.16 (2004).
150. Id. (Senator Jesse Helms, who said: “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child is incompatible with the God-given right and responsibility of parents to raise their
children.”).
151. Policy Issues, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2008).
152. E.g., Dennison, supra note 12; Swanson, supra note 134.
153. See supra Part III.C.2.
154. Swanson, supra note 134, at 190.
155. Grady, supra note 102. In fact, each year Britain needs at least 500 donors to provide sperm
to about 4,000 women. In 2006, only 307 donors registered; this shortage may have been due to the
anonymity ban in 2005. Also, in the past, for every 100 men solicited, about five to ten would choose
to donate; now, the number has decreased to fewer than five. Id.
156. Ilke Turkmendag, Robert Dingwall & Therese Murphy, The Removal of Donor Anonymity in
the U.K.: Silencing of Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT’L J. OF L., POL’Y & FAM. 283, 284 (2008).
157. E.g., Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20, at 519–20; Yuen, supra note 10, at 545–48.
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scarcity here as well, which could lead to negative effects worse than the
problems with the current process.
1. Why Exposed Donation Would Lead to Scarcity
Studies have shown that about half of sperm donors would not donate if
anonymity were banned.158 Although a donor may donate with the nonpecuniary intentions to help women and couples unable to have children any
other way, he may not be comfortable with the idea that a child conceived with
his sperm may contact him at any unexpected moment in his life. The donor
may fear that a relationship, or even contact, with the child may interfere with
the donor’s later family life.159 Despite knowing what his sperm may be used
for, a donor may be psychologically disturbed when confronted with knowledge
of an actual offspring conceived with his sperm.160 He may even feel
embarrassment over his previous decision to donate,161 particularly if he
changed his mind over time. A donor may even fear or resent that an additional
legal obligation, such as child support, has been thrust upon him or that he will
be subject to paternity suits or even that the child will bring an inheritance
claim.162 In fact, if anonymity is the primary reason or factor that donors are not
legal parents,163 banning anonymous donation may lead to courts deciding that
donors are legal parents of donor-conceived children.
2. The Negative Effects of Scarcity Due to Exposed Donation
Should the United States choose to address the current lack of sperm bank
regulation by banning anonymous donation, the scarcity that is likely to result
would have many far-ranging consequences that affect both women and couples
seeking sperm and donor-conceived children. First, the forced exposed donation
and resulting shortage of donated sperm may place undue burdens on
procreation and force childlessness, especially since it may cause an increase in
the cost of sperm.164 The fact that ART falls under the constitutionally-protected
right to privacy in reproductive choice explains the current laissez-faire
approach to regulation,165 as regulators may fear that more regulation may
violate that right. However, as Part V will point out, the United States can reach
a middle ground between inadequate regulation and intrusion on this important
right. It is also arguable that a married couple’s constitutionally recognized right
to procreate is broad enough to encompass ART.166 Additionally, if one can
accept ART as a “public good,” the ban and scarcity may cause dignitary harms

158. Cahn, supra note 111, at 16 (citing Eric D. Blyth, Lucy Frith & Abigail Farrand, Is it Possible to
Recruit Gamete Donors Who Are Both Altruistic and Identifiable?, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY J. S21 (2005)).
159. Swanson, supra note 134, at 180.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Dennison, supra note 12, at 21.
163. See generally Paul Bailin, Ferguson v. McKiernan: The Problematic Concept of Technological
Paternity, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2008).
164. Dennison, supra note 12, at 19 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
165. Id. at 10.
166. Daar, supra note 27, at 51–57.
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due to the denial of equal access to public goods on the basis of immutable
characteristics.167
Other consequences address the very real likelihood that people will find a
way to circumvent this undesirable ban on anonymous donation, or seek sperm
where it is not in short supply. The shortage may encourage “middlemen” to
respond to the excess demand by facilitating cross-border transactions, 168 which
could result in “fertility tourism.”169 Does it make sense to protect the parties to
sperm donation by regulating sperm banks in a way that results in the parties
going elsewhere to participate in the process, to places where donation may be
even less regulated than in the United States?170 Scarcity may also cause women
and couples to resort to informal practices, such as asking a friend for sperm.171
Those situations could result in the friend being deemed a legal parent of the
child, since courts often acknowledge non-parent status for a friend-donor only
when it very closely resembles a “conventional, anonymous sperm donation.”172
This would require at least an oral contract exempting the friend from child
support obligations and other responsibilities and obligations.173
Lastly, this scarcity may even exacerbate the current problem of
consanguinity. It is unlikely that sperm donation would cease altogether
because some donors would likely continue to donate despite having to expose
their identities. This could result in more donations per donor, in order to meet
the excess demand arising from the shortage. Thus, the chances of many
children conceived from one donor residing in one geographical area would
greatly increase the chances of incest.
B. Donor Privacy
As mentioned above, a donor’s expectation of privacy may be diminished,
allowing sperm banks to disclose the identity or even medical history of
donors.174 It appears that if donors are no longer permitted to withhold their
identity, a court may choose to draw the privacy line even further away from
total protection of donor medical information. Thus, a court could allow access
to a donor’s complete medical file, which includes all medical history as well as
other private information.

167. Id. at 57–62. For example, a “public accommodation” is defined in the Americans with
Disabilities Act to include the “professional office of a health care provider.” American with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 121821(7)(F) (2008).
168. Yuen, supra note 10, at 541–43.
169. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20, at 5–8. “Fertility tourism” occurs when those seeking
fertility services, such as sperm, travel to, or purchase from, other countries for those services or
products. See generally id.
170. The opposite effect may result if the United States continues to allow anonymous donation:
others may choose to come to this country to obtain these services.
171. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20, at 4.
172. See generally Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. 2007). Bailin, supra note 66.
173. See Ferguson, 855 A.2d at 124; Bailin, supra note 66. This would also help to ensure that the
donor’s right to privacy is not diminished and thus that the Johnson reasoning (supra Part III.B) does
not apply.
174. See generally Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000).
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C. Harm to Parents
When a donor’s identity is known to a donor-conceived child and her
family, parents may fear that the donor’s role in the child’s life may cause an
interruption in their own family life or in the parent’s rearing of the child.175 A
parent may also experience embarrassment at others knowing that her child was
conceived through ART, because it may imply infertility or an alternative
lifestyle which the parent may not have disclosed to everyone she knows.176 It
could also be problematic in paternity hearings if the exposed donor appeared
to assert parental rights; currently this fear would be irrational because most
states do not allow a sperm donor to assert such rights, at least so long as the
donation was anonymous.177
D. Harms to ART Providers
The medical profession “has incentives to maintain donor anonymity” for
several reasons.178 First, a dramatic decrease in donations may have economic
consequences for ART providers. Scarcity and thus fewer purchases may cause
many sperm banks to go out of business. This results in a smaller number of
sperm banks, and thus a greater concentration of donated sperm. As mentioned
above, this will also magnify the consanguinity problem. Also, these providers
may suffer reputational harms should they no longer be able to assure their
donor patients that their information will be kept confidential.179 Also, banning
anonymity may negatively affect physician autonomy in that the providers will
no longer be able to independently decide when identifying and medical
information should be disclosed.
E. Harms to Society
The state’s interest in the institution of marriage180 causes it to “favor
conduct that furthers marriage.”181 The use of ART promotes marriage in
various ways, such as by bringing couples psychologically closer together
through the conception and raising of a child.182 It also allows more couples to
have children, which in turn leads to martial stability.183 By making it more
difficult for couples to conceive children when conventional options are
unavailable, a ban on anonymity would keep this important interest from
extending to all citizens.

175. Swanson, supra note 134, at 180.
176. Id.
177. Dennison, supra note 12, 18–19.
178. Swanson, supra note 134, at 182.
179. See id. This could even be deemed an unconstitutional “interference with the obligation of
contracts” by Congress since it would violate the contract between current donors and their sperm
banks, which promise anonymity.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 183.
183. Id.
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V. PROPOSAL: UPA & UNIFORM SYSTEM OF LAWS REGULATING SPERM BANKS
This article’s proposal solves the concerns with current regulations in a
way that does not cause the problems that a ban on anonymity would create. In
fact, in its 2007 regulations the European Union took similar action, by requiring
member states to register sperm donations without imposing any rules relating
to anonymity.184 An effective way to enforce the following framework would be
for the United States to pass a comprehensive ART Act,185 which would fill in
the gaps left by states that have not adopted the new UPA and by the lack of
attention paid to the other concerns addressed above.
A. Requiring Sperm Banks to Report Births
A way to lessen the risk of incest among donor-conceived children is to
require sperm banks to report, or at least track, births. Special attention should
be paid to the number of births per donor. This could be done through state
licensing laws or through FDA regulation.186 This would not infringe on donor
privacy rights in any way, as it can still be done through a bank-created registry
using randomly assigned donor identification numbers.187 It would merely be a
way to tie separate donor-conceived children to a single donor. Banks would be
required to enter the information each time a donation is made. These children
would then be able to contact the sperm bank to determine if another donorconceived child is a half-sibling before engaging in a physical relationship. In
the United Kingdom, before anonymity was banned altogether, donor children
could contact the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s Registry to
verify that they were not biologically related.188 A similar database should be
created in the United States, modeled after the voluntary Donor Sibling Registry
(DSR).189 In fact, at a recent symposium, the three largest sperm banks
“advocated for the creation of a voluntary registry run by a non-profit entity.”190
It is important to note that this article advocates a federal approach to
sperm bank regulation because state implementation of a registry is replete with
problems. Even if uniform legislation is created, individual states may modify it

184. Daryl Lindsey, Danish Sperm Bank Deposits to Remain Tax-Free and Anonymous, SPIEGEL
ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL,
Feb.
1,
2008,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
0,1518,532388,00.html. Also, France does not guarantee a child’s right to know his or her origins.
Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child’s Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting Approaches Under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 INT’L J. LAW,
POL’Y & FAM. 137, 154 (2007).
185. This note does not address any potential federalism issues.
186. For this to be done via FDA regulation, sperm donation and/or banking would need to fall
under the Food and Drug Act.
187. These numbers could at some point be tied to the donor’s social security number or other
identifying information, so as to avoid one man donating at several banks to circumvent the
donation limit.
188. Dennison, supra note 12, at 16 (citing The HFEA Register For Donors, Human Fertilisation &
Embryology Authority, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/1213.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008)).
189. Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2008);
see supra Part II.D.4.
190. Pamela Foohey, Potential National Voluntary Gamete Donor Registry Discussed at Recent Health
Law Symposium, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 597, 599 (2008).
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before enactment, much like the UPA, thus causing it to vary drastically.191
Multiple state registries may make it nearly impossible for a child to utilize the
system without knowing exactly in which state his mother purchased the
sperm.192 Also, an additional oversight entity may be required to ensure
cooperation and coordination among states.193 Lastly, having fifty registries
would likely result in nationwide duplicative effort.194
A simpler solution to the consanguinity problem is DNA and parentage
blood testing, which is currently a readily available resource. Donor-conceived
children worried about consanguinity could contract with a testing laboratory to
determine whether they share the same sperm donor. A huge flaw in each of
these solutions is that in order for them to be effective, both children must know
that they were conceived using donor sperm; otherwise, they would not even
consider checking for consanguinity. It is worth taking a moment to note the
importance of this disclosure. Knowledge of the circumstances of their
conception allows donor-conceived children to utilize the resources available,
and those proposed here, to have a complete medical history and to be aware of
the risk of incest. Because it can be an unsettling event for any donor-conceived
child, studies have shown that the earlier in life the child is told, the better.195
This enables the child to adapt well and to seek support from other donorconceived children. It also avoids feelings of betrayal should the child
accidentally find out later in life. However, there are some parents that will still
choose to keep their child’s donor-conception a secret, either to protect their
children or because they fear it will diminish the father’s role.196 Thus, the most
successful way to avoid the consanguinity concern is to require reporting or
recording of births per donor, and even enforcing a limit per geographical area
as the AFS guidelines already recommend.197 This will ensure that, even if some
children remain unaware of their status, there is at least a limit on donor births
per geographic area.
B. Allowing Access to Information by Court Order
Giving donor-conceived children and their parents access to donor
information would address situations where a child needs to know relevant
medical history.198 The court order required would only be given “for good
cause,” and would allow access only to the most relevant information and never
to identifying information when non-identifying information is sufficient. This is
191. Cahn, supra note 111, at 19.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Sperm Bank Information, Tell Donor Children Early in Life, July 15, 2008,
http://www.spermbankinformation.com/2008/07/15/tell-donor-children-early-in-life/;
Science
Daily, Children Born After Donor Insemination Should Be Told As Soon As Possible About Their
Conception, July 7, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/07/080707100203.htm.
196. Patricia Wen, To Tell the Truth, BOSTON.COM, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/
health/articles/2008/02/04/to_tell_the_truth/.
197. Fertility Society, supra note 90, at S4 .
198. E.g., if a child needs information regarding a possible genetic illness or a more complete
medical history.
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the exact standard used by the UPA and the Johnson court. As mentioned, the
“good cause” standard has been construed to encompass circumstances such as
when detection of a genetic disease or location of a relative for a transplant is
necessary.199 Other state courts have not given any attention to what constitutes
“good cause,” so an ideal comprehensive regulatory scheme should enumerate
situations where it would be appropriate to release information. This specificity
would alleviate a donor’s concerns that his privacy will be encroached upon in
situations where the need for the information is not a medical necessity. Also,
unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States should not
allow automatic disclosure of information when a donor-conceived child
reaches the age of majority, as it could cause further diminishment of a donor’s
privacy rights by putting donors on notice that information will be disclosed.
Lastly, instituting a national registry as discussed in the previous subsection
could be used to encourage donors to contact their donor-conceived children
should the donor develop a genetic disease after donation. If necessary to
preserve anonymity, this communication could take place through the sperm
bank used for donation. Admittedly, there may be disadvantages to a registry,
such as an increase in the cost of ARTs and a possible decrease in donations.200
However, if a streamlined, national registry is used, the cost per donation or per
purchase may be minimal. Also, as the next section will show, if all states take
steps to recognize that a donor is not a legal parent, donors should not be
deterred simply because there will be a registry, especially since this article
proposes a truly anonymous registry.
C. Establishing Donors’ Non-Parent Status
All states should set forth that a donor is not considered the legal parent of
a child conceived with his sperm. This will not only assuage donors’ concerns
that donating will expose them to legal and financial responsibilities to a child,
but will also ease parents’ worries about donor interference. Although at least
nineteen states have adopted the previous version of the UPA, which states that
a when a child is conceived through artificial insemination using a donor’s
sperm, the donor is not considered the child’s father, 201 very few have adopted
the new UPA which specifically applies to ART and both married and
unmarried users of donated sperm.202 Each state should either strive to adopt
the new UPA or at the very least enact a statute setting forth a donor’s status.
Some state courts have recognized this by finding non-parental status when a
truly anonymous donation has taken place. For example, in 2007 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to treat a donor as a legal father because
the parties had “preserved enough of the trappings of a conventional,
anonymous sperm donation.”203 However, in the ever-evolving world of ART,
this limited common law is not sufficient; specific statutory language is needed.

199. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 875 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000).
200. Foohey, supra note 190.
201. Paul Bailin, Ferguson v. McKiernan: The Problematic Concept of Technological Paternity, 36 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2008) (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973)).
202. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 702(2002).
203. Bailin, supra note 201, at 425 (citing Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. 2007)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Federal and state regulation of sperm donation lags far behind the
constantly evolving science of ART, causing uncertainty, fear, and even medical
harm. The donor is unsure of his legal relationship to a child born from artificial
insemination using his sperm. The child worries that she will be unable to
confirm her genetic history, or that her donor has developed a genetic disorder
since donating. Any time two donor-conceived people enter into an intimate
relationship, they are taking a risk that they may be biologically related and that
any resulting children will suffer the consequences. The solution is not to
remove an aspect that makes the artificial insemination process available and
efficient—anonymity. It is to address the gaps and flaws in current regulation
with practical, specific and clear mandates that do not discourage donation. In
the meantime, this article’s proposal will hopefully result in an increase in the
ratio of donors who voluntarily release their identities to anonymous donors,204
due to more awareness of the underlying flaws of the current sperm donation
process.

204.

Foohey, supra note 190, at 598.

